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Abstract 
In this paper, we present a novel quantum secret key encryption algorithm 
based on quantum discrete logarithm problem (QDLP). QDLP is to find the exponent 
x from å=
i
x
i p mod gC  if C, å
i
ig  and the prime p are given, where 
pmodgg ii =  for generator g. According to our knowledge, QDLP cannot be solved 
by Shor’s quantum algorithm. Our algorithm assumes that the sender and the receiver 
share the secret key x. If the sender wants to send the message y to the receiver, the 
receiver first uses the secret key x to construct a quantum system å
i
x
i p mod gi . 
Then, the receiver sends the quantum channel å
i
x
i p mod g  to the sender. After 
receiving å
i
x
i p mod g , the sender uses the secret key x and the message y to 
generate ciphertext å
i
y
i p mod xg . The receiver then construct a quantum system 
å
i
y
i p mod xgi . According to the secret key x, the receiver can compute and obtain 
final quantum system å
i
y p mod gi . Then, the receiver gets the value pmodgy  
after measuring. Finally, the receiver can successfully recover the message y by using 
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Shor’s quantum algorithm. Obviously, the quantum system will be broken after 
transferring messages. But, the secret key x can still be used repeatedly in our 
algorithm. 
 
1. Introduction 
In quantum cryptography [1], secretly transferring messages between two entries 
is an important issue. Obviously, two entries can use quantum key distribution 
protocol [2] to obtain the secret key. With the secret key, two entries can use the 
one-time pads method in classical cryptography to secretly transfer the message. 
However, the secret key can be used once. If we want to use the secret key repeatedly, 
we must design a quantum secret key encryption algorithm. According to [4], 
Brassard and Bennett’s key distribution protocol can be modified as the secret key 
encryption algorithm. Assume that the sender and the receiver share n secret bases. If 
the sender wants to transfer the message of n classical bits, he must generate n 
quantum states, viewed as ciphertexts. The i-th quantum state only depends on the i-th 
basis and the i-th classical bit of the message. After receiving the i- th quantum state, 
the receiver can use the i-th basis to measure the state and obtains the i-th classical bit 
of the message. Therefore, the modified Brassard and Bennett’s protocol with shared 
bases can secretly transfer the message. 
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However, the secret key in the modified Brassard and Bennett’s protocol is 
traceable due to the following attack. Assume that an attacker pretends the sender. He 
randomly selects a message of n classical bits and n bases. He generates n quantum 
states by using n bases and n classical bits, and sends them to the receiver. The 
receiver discovers n classical bits by measuring these quantum states with his n secret 
bases. Assume that the attacker obtains the discovered classical bits after 
transformation. If the i-th classical bit of the message is different from the i-th 
discovered classical bit, the attacker learns that the i-th secret basis is another one 
different from his i-th selected basis. Thus, the attacker can recover 
4
n
 secret bases 
on average. To avoid this attack, this paper presents a novel quantum secret key 
encryption algorithm based on the quantum discrete logarithm problem. 
In this paper, we first define the quantum discrete logarithm problem (QDLP). 
QDLP is similar to classical discrete logarithm problem (DLP). DLP is to find the 
exponent x from p mod gC x=  if C, g, and p are known. QDLP differs from DLP in 
that the base g is changed into a superposition å
i
ig . Thus, QDLP is to find x from 
å=
i
x
i p mod gC  if C, å
i
ig , and p are given. According to our knowledge, 
QDLP cannot be solved by Shor’s algorithm [3]. Based on QDLP, we present a novel 
quantum secret key encryption algorithm. Assume that the receiver, Alice, and the 
sender, Bob, share the secret key x. Then, Bob wants to send a message y to Alice. 
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Thus, Alice prepares two quantum registers to construct her quantum channel. Let p 
and q be large primes satisfying 1p|q - . She generates n-1 states i  in first register, 
where i from 1 to q-1, and then uses secret key x to compute å
-
=
1q
1i
q mod ix pmodg  
which will be stored in second register. Thus, Alice has å
-
=
1q
1i
q mod x
i p mod gi , where 
p mod gg ii = . Alice sends her quantum channel å
-
=
1q
1i
x
i p mod g  to Bob. After Bob 
gets Alice’s quantum channel, Bob computes the ciphertext 
åå
-
=
-
=
=
- 1q
1i
y
i
1q
1i
xyx
i pmodxgpmodxg
1
q , where y is message and 1qx
-  satisfies 
1 q mod xx 1q =
- . Then, Bob sends it to Alice. After Alice receives Bob’s ciphertext, 
she constructs å
-
=
1q
1i
y
i pmodxgi  by combining her original first register. She uses 
1
px
- , the inverse of x modulo p, and the inverse of i to compute 
å
-
=
- -
1q
1i
yi
i
1
p pmodxgxi
1
å
-
=
=
1q
1i
y p mod gi . Then, Alice obtains pmodgy  by 
measuring the second register. At last, Alice obtains the message y by Shor’s quantum 
algorithm [3]. According to the properties of quantum system, the quantum states will 
disappear after measurement. Thus, the quantum channel is used once for a message. 
Although the quantum channel is temporarily generated, the secret key x can be used 
repeatedly. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define the 
quantum discrete logarithm problem. Section 3 presents a novel quantum secret key 
encryption algorithm. We discuss and analyze our algorithm in Section 4. Finally, we 
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draw the conclusions in Section 5. 
 
2. Quantum discrete logarithm problem 
In this section, we define the quantum discrete logarithm problem in Definition 1 
and its general case in Definition 2. 
Definition 1: (Quantum Discrete Logarithm Problem, QDLP) 
Let p and q be two known large primes satisfying q|p-1. We can find g with order 
q modulo p. The quantum discrete logarithm problem is to find x from the 
superposition å
-
=-
1q
1i
q mod x
i pmodgi1q
1
, where p mod gg ii = .                
The quantum discrete logarithm is similar to the classical discrete logarithm 
problem because å
-
=
1q
1i
i p mod g  and p are known. But, the classical discrete 
logarithm problem is tractable due to Shor’s algorithm. Shor’s algorithm can discover 
x from p mod gC x= . Shor prepares three quantum registers. He puts the first two 
registers in the uniform superposition of all a  and b  (mod p-1), and computes 
p mod Cg ba -  in the third register. He has åå
-
=
-
=
-
-
2p
0a
2p
0b
ba p mod Cgba
1p
1
. Further, 
Shor can find the discrete logarithm x with two modular exponentiations and two 
quantum Fourier trans forms. But, how to solve the quantum discrete logarithm 
problem by Shor’s algorithm? According to Shor’s algorithm, we add one quantum 
register that put the uniform superposition of all jg , where j ]2p..1[ -Î , and then 
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replace g with å
-
=
1q
1i
ji p mod g , where p mod gg
i
jji = . Then we have 
 åååå
-
=
-
=
-
=
-
=
-
---
1q
1i
2p
1j
2p
0a
2p
0b
b
ji
a
jij p mod Cggba)2p)(1q()1p(
1
,  
where p mod gC xjiji = . Because the generator jig  is unknown, we must try all 
possible values å
-
=
2p
1j
jg . Moreover, according to Shor’s algorithm, we must also 
know the values of jiC . Thus, it is difficult to obtain the discrete logarithm by Shor’s 
algorithm.  
In the following, we present the general case of QDLP in Definition 2 by 
modifing the first quantum register of Definition 1.  
Definition 2: (General case of QDLP) 
Given a large prime p, we can find g with order r modulo p. Let 0a , 1a , … , 
1ka -  are integers, less than r, satisfying GCD( ia , r)=1, where ]1k..0[i -Î . The 
general case of QDLP is to find x from the superposition å
-
=
1k
0i
x
ai pmodga
k
1
i
, 
where p mod gg i
i
a
a = .                                                 
The general case of QDLP is more difficult than QDLP if 0a , 1a , … , 1ka -  are 
unknown. 
 
3. Our algorithm 
In this section, we first introduce the parameters in our algorithm. We choose two 
large primes p and q satisfying q|p-1. Then, we find *pZgÎ  satisfying 1pmodg
q = . 
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Assume that the sender, Bob, wants to send the message y to the receiver, Alice. They 
must share the secret key *qZxÎ  whose inverse 
1
qx
-  satisfying 1q mod xx 1q =
-  
and inverse 1px
-  satisfying 1p mod xx 1p =
- . Bob and Alice perform the following 
steps to transfer the message y. 
Step 1: 
Alice prepares two quantum registers å
-
=-
1q
1i
0i
1q
1
. Alice uses the secret key 
x to compute the exponent of g to the power of ix and store it in second register, 
i.e. å
-
=-
1q
1i
q mod ix p mod gi
1q
1
. Let p mod gg ii = . This quantum system is 
rewritten as å
-
=-
1q
1i
q mod x
i p mod gi1q
1
. Let the quantum channel be 
å
-
=
=F
1q
1i
x
iA
p mod g . Alice then sends 
A
F  to Bob. 
Step 2: 
After receiving 
A
F , Bob uses the message y, the secret key x and the inverse 
1
qx
-  to compute the ciphertext å
-
=
-
=F
1q
1i
xyx
ic
p mod xg
1
q  å
-
=
=
1q
1i
y
i p mod xg . 
Then, Bob sends 
c
F  to Alice. 
Step 3: 
After receiving 
c
F , Alice can obtain a quantum system 
å
-
=-
=F
1q
1i
y
iD
p mod xgi
1q
1
1
 because she holds the original first quantum 
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register. Then, Alice uses the inverse 1px
-  to compute 
åå
-
=
-
=
-
-
=
-
=F
1q
1i
y
i
1q
1i
y
i
1
pD
p mod gi
1q
1
p mod xgxi
1q
1
2
. 
Finally, Alice computes the second register to power of the inverse 1i-  and 
obtains  
åå
-
=
-
= -
=
-
=F
- 1q
1i
y
1q
1i
yi
iD
p mod gi
1q
1
p mod gi
1q
1 1
3
.  
Because i<q and q is a prime, each value i has the inverse 1i-  satisfying 
1q mod ii 1 =´ - . Thus, Alice can measure the second register and obtains the 
result p mod gy . Because g and p are known, Alice easily discovers y by using 
Shor’s algorithm. 
Example: 
Let p=11, q=5, g=3 and secret key x=3. Assume that Bob wants to send message 
y=3 to Alice. Then, they perform Step 1 to Step 3 as follows. 
Step 1: 
Alice generates the quantum channel 
å
=
4
1i
5 mod x
i 11 mod gi
4
1
 
)11 mod 34       
11 mod 3311 mod 3211 mod 31(
2
1
5 mod 34
5 mod 335 mod 325 mod 31
´
´´´
+
++=
     
( )94433251
2
1
+++= . 
Alice sends 9435
A
+++=F  to Bob. 
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Step 2: 
Bob uses y=3, x=3 and 2x 1q =
-  to compute the ciphertext 
11mod93          
11mod4311mod3311mod53
5 mod 23
5 mod 235 mod 235 mod 23
c
´
´´´
´+
´+´+´=F
    
5194 +++= . 
Then, Bob sends 
c
F  to Alice. 
Step 3: 
Alice obtains the quantum system  
å
=
+++==F
4
1i
y
iD
)54139241(
2
1
p mod xgi
2
1
1
. 
Then, Alice uses 4x 1p =
-  to compute 
( )11 mod 54411 mod 14311 mod 94211 mod 441
2
1
p mod xgxi
2
1 1q
1i
y
i
1
pD 2
´+´+´+´=
=F å
-
=
-
    
( )94433251
2
1
+++= . 
Finally, Alice computes the second register to power of the inverse of the first 
register and obtains  
å
=
-
=F
4
1i
q mod yi
iD
p mod gi
2
1 1
3
 
( )11 mod 9411 mod 4311 mod 3211 mod 51
2
1 4231 +++=  
( )54535251
2
1
+++= . 
Thus, Alice can measure the second register and obtains the output. Then, we 
have 5p mod gy = . Because g=3 and p=11 is known, Alice easily computes y=3 
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by using Shor’s algorithm. 
 
4. Discussion and analysis 
We divide four cases to discuss and analyze our algorithm in this section.  
Assume that an eavesdropper, called Nancy, exists in quantum channel. 
Case 1:  
Assume that an eavesdropper wants to get secret key x from quantum channel or 
ciphertext. He must face the QDLP. According to our knowledge, QDLP cannot be 
solved by Shor’s quantum algorithm. Thus, our algorithm can prevent the attacks 
from quantum algorithms. Moreover, in our algorithm, the quantum channel is broke 
after measuring. However, Alice and Bob still securely share the secret key. Thus, we 
can use the secret key x more than once in our algorithm. 
Case 2: 
Assume that Nancy steals the ciphertext å
-
=
=F
1q
1i
y
ic
p mod xg . Nancy wants to 
discover the message y by using the measurement. Nancy can measures 
c
F  and 
obtains a value C¢ . Assume that p mod xgC yj=¢ , where }1q..1{j -Î . Because x 
and jg  are unknown, Nancy cannot perform Shor’s quantum algorithm to obtain the 
value y. 
Case 3: 
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Assume that Nancy forges the Alice’s quantum channel to get the message y. 
Nancy can construct the quantum system as å
-
=
¢
-
1q
1i
q mod x
i p mod gi1q
1
, where x¢  
is the forged secret key. Nancy sends å
-
=
¢
¢ -
=F
1q
1i
x
iA
p mod g
1q
1
 to Bob. At last, 
Nancy gets the ciphertext å
-
=
¢
¢
-
-
=F
1q
1i
yxx
ic
p mod xg
1q
1 1q . Then, Nancy uses the 
inverse 1qx
-¢  to compute 
åå
-
=
-
=
¢¢
¢
---
-
=
-
=F
1q
1i
yx
i
1q
1i
yxxx
iD
p mod xg
1q
1
p mod xg
1q
1 1q1q1q
1
. 
Finally, Nancy computes the second register to power of the inverse of the first 
register and obtains 
åå
-
=
-
=
¢
---
-
=
-
=F
1q
1i
yxi
1q
1i
iyx
iD
p mod gx
1q
1
p mod )xg(
1q
1 1q11-1q
2
. 
Because x is unknown, Nancy obtains the va lue pmod)gx(
11
q
1 iyx
i
i -
--
. Thus, Nancy 
cannot decrypt the ciphertext to get message y by Shor’s algorithm unless she knows 
the secret key x. 
Case 4: 
We can prepare the first quantum register as Definition 2. Alice prepares the 
quantum system å
-
=
1k
0i
x
ai pmodga
k
1
i
. In the first quantum register, the value ia  
satisfies GCD( ia , r)=1, where r is the order of g modulo p. It is more difficult for 
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Nancy to get the secret key x from quantum channel å
-
=
1k
0i
x
a pmodg i . Furthermore, it 
is also difficult to discover the message y from the ciphertext å
-
=
=F
1k
0i
y
ac
pmodxg
i
. 
Thus, based on the general case of QDLP, the quantum secret key encryption 
algorithm is more secret. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we define the quantum discrete logarithm problem (QDLP). QDLP 
differs from DLP in that the base g is changed into a superposition å
i
ig . QDLP is 
to find x from å=
i
x
i p mod gC  if C, å
i
ig , and p are known. According to my 
knowledge, QDLP cannot be solved by Shor’s algorithm. Based on QDLP, we present 
a novel quantum secret key encryption algorithm. Assume that Bob wants to send a 
message y to Alice. Alice prepares two quantum registers to construct her quantum 
channel. At last, Alice obtains the message y by Shor’s quantum algorithm [3]. 
According to the properties of quantum system, the channel will be broken after 
measuring. Thus, the quantum channel is used once for a message. Although the 
quantum channel is temporarily constructed, the secret key x can be used repeatedly. 
Furthermore, we discuss that our quantum algorithm is based on the general case of 
QDLP. Because å
i
a pmodg i  is unknown, this algorithm is more secure. 
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